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Economic Theory Applied to





Except in rare cases, murderer's red hand falls on one victim
only, however grim the blow; but the foul hand of the drug dealer
blights life after life and, like the vampire of fable, creates others in
its owner's evil image.... 1
In the seven years since the Fifth Circuit made this statement
against drug dealers, the United States has experienced a substantial
increase in drug crimes.2 Indeed, most people would agree that drug
trafficking is an offensive, damaging activity, and that those who do it
deserve punishment. In addition to penal sanctions, under the federal
civil forfeiture statute3 economic sanctions are imposed to punish4
drug crimes. These sanctions have been imposed indiscriminately
against drug dealers and drug possessors alike. This Note uses eco-
nomic analysis to answer the question: how much property is consti-
tutionally forfeitable as punishment for drug crimes?
Introduction
To illustrate this question, consider the following two cases:
* J.D., 1995; B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 1992. I dedicate this Note
to my son, A.J. whose love and precocious wisdom made my law school experience beara-
ble. Special thanks to Judge Alex Kozinski whose relentless red pen sharpened my legal
writing skills, and to Professors Jack Hirshleifer and Harold Demesetz for teaching me the
utility of assumptions.
1. Terrebone v. Butler, 820 F.2d 156, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1987).
2. This increase is documented by the rise in inmates convicted of drug crimes. See
Drug Crimes Boost Prison Population, L.A. TIMs, May 10, 1993, at 14 (reporting Justice
Department statistics which reveal a new high in the prison population and attribute the
increase in part to the boost in drug crime convictions).
3. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
4. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2810-11 (1993) (stating the proposi-
tion that civil forfeiture is punishment).
[1939]
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(1) In 1990, the government seized a tavern and two adjacent apart-
ments in Chicago under a civil forfeiture statute.5 This action came
after a sale of over 3 kilograms of cocaine (with a street value of
approximately $126,0006) occurred on the property while the prop-
erty owner served as a lookout.7 Because the property facilitated
the sale of a dangerous drug, the government took ownership of the
Chicago buildings8 which were certainly worth far more than the
$126,000 value of the drug bust.9
(2) In 1991, the Hamilton, Ohio police discovered 354 marijuana
plants in the home of Ernie and Barbara Sizemore.10 Approxi-
mately 25 of these plants were mature, each of which would yield
about seven to eight grams of marijuana." The Sizemores claimed
to have grown the marijuana solely for their own use,12 and the
state court gave them the lightest sentences and fines permissible
under Ohio law.13 Nonetheless, the federal government took own-
ership of the Sizemore's home.' 4 Thus, for the mere possession of
$137.5015 worth of marijuana, the home was forfeited. 16
The underlying crimes triggering forfeiture in the cases above im-
posed significantly different harms upon society. For example, the
U.S. Department of Justice recognizes that cocaine is especially nota-
ble for its addictive power, and that such addictive drugs maintain a
relationship with crime both in that some users steal to support their
habit, and that violent offenses occur with the drug distribution it-
self.' 7 Moreover, the California Governor's Budget Summary for
1992-1993 allocated over 22 million dollars for drug programs, largely
to combat addiction to drugs such as cocaine.' 8
Conversely, the Senate Committee reporting on the Comprehen-
sive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act concluded that mari-
juana is not physically addictive, and that violent crimes are not likely
5. United States v. 4114 West North Avenue, No. 89C4946, 1990 WL 207377, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 1990).
6. DRUGS AND CRIME DATA CENTER & CLEARINGHOUSE, FACT SHEET: DRUG
DATA SUMMARY 8 (1994).
7. 4114 West North Avenue, 1990 WL 207377 at *1, *6.
8. Id. at *1.
9. While the case did not reveal the value of the forfeited property, it is safe to
conclude that the 1990 property value of a tavern and two apartment buildings located in
Chicago, Illinois far exceeds the $126,000 street value of the drugs confiscated.
10. United States v. 311 Cleveland Avenue, 799 F. Supp. 824, 826 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
11. Id. at 826.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 824.
15. DRUGS AND CRIME DATA CENTER & CLEARINGHOUSE, FACT SHEET: DRUG
DATA SUMMARY 8 (1994).
16. 311 Cleveland Avenue, 799 F. Supp. at 824.
17. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DRUGS, CRIME, AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 2
(1992).
18. Governor's Budget Summary 1994-1995, appendix schedule 9, p 39.
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linked to marijuana use because users tend to become "passive."' 9 Fi-
naUy, the amounts which would have been spent by users on the street
had the respective drugs been distributed are substantially different-
$126,00020 in the Chicago case,2 1 verses $137.5022 in the Ohio case.23
Thus, even though the crimes imposed disproportionate harm upon
society, through in rem forfeiture,24 the outcome in both was acces-
sion of the property to the United States government.25
Penalties such as these which do not consider the underlying
crime may violate the "excessive fines" clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment of the Constitution. 26 And from an economic standpoint, impo-
sition of fixed sanctions is inefficient because this disproportionate
cost allocation shifts wealth randomly without considering the actual
harm caused, how much of a fine is necessary to deter, or the party's
respective valuation of resources.
Economic theory recognizes that activities often cause external
costs-costs created by the actor which are borne by others external
to him.27 Drug crimes create external societal costs in the areas of law
enforcement, judicial and legal services, corrections, related health
problems, drug programs, and drug awareness education.28 Linking
the external costs created by the underlying crime to the forfeiture
would deter efficiently without needless shifting of resources. For ex-
ample, imposition of a proportionate fine based on the societal costs
associated with marijuana possession and a deterrence multiple29
19. H. R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970).
20. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
21. 4114 West North Avenue, 1990 WL 207377.
22. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
23. 311 Cleveland Avenue, 799 F. Supp. at 826.
24. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
25. See supra notes 8 and 14. Forfeiture has proven quite profitable for the govern-
ment. Justice Kennedy recently commented on the government's stake in forfeiture by
quoting a 1990 memo from the Attorney General urging United States Attorneys to
increase the volume of forfeitures in order to meet the Department of Justice's
annual budget target: "We must significantly increase production to reach our
budget target. Failure to achieve the $470 million projection would expose the
Department's forfeiture program to criticism and undermine confidence in our
budget projections. Every effort must be made to increase forfeiture income dur-
ing the remaining three months of [fiscal year] 1990."
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S.Ct. 492, 502 n.2 (1993) (quoting
38 EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY'S BULLETIN 180 (1990)).
26. See Part I of this Note, outlining the Austin v. United States decision which holds
that an Eighth Amendment excessiveness inquiry must be satisfied before property can be
forfeited. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
27. See Part III(A) for discussion of external costs.
28. See Part M1I(A) and text accompanying notes 138 and 142-43.
29. See Part IV of this Note for development of a model for the imposition of propor-
tionate fines.
would likely have deterred the Sizemores in the Ohio case from grow-
ing marijuana. Accordingly, the important goal of deterrence 30 would
be accomplished with a fine proportionate to the harm caused in an
amount sufficient to deter.
Conversely, forfeiture of the entire property was likely far more
punishment than necessary to deter. This was inefficient reallocation
of resources because the home was almost certainly more valued by
the Sizemores than by the government; thus forfeiture shifted re-
sources to a less valued use. Moreover, the forfeiture probably caused
avoidable transaction costs in the form of the property owner's ap-
peals and the government's resale costs.
Nonetheless, until the summer of 1993, the government took
property without considering proportionality. Then, in June 1993, the
United States Supreme Court mandated a constitutional inquiry in
civil forfeiture cases.31 This holding provides an opportunity to
achieve deterrence with economic efficiency and forms the basis of
this Note.
Part I of this note outlines the Austin v. United States32 decision,
including the Court's analysis of the history of both the Eighth
Amendment and forfeiture, focusing on how this history supports the
Austin decision. Part II describes a possible constitutionality test for
trial courts imposing forfeiture - a proportionality analysis derived
from Solem v. Helm. 33 Part III explores application of economic the-
ory to achieve efficiency and deterrence through reallocation of the
external costs associated with drug crimes. Part IV suggests, and ap-
plies to the two forfeiture cases above, a model system which propor-
tionally allocates external costs: "the external cost index." This model
uses 3 factors: 1) the Sentencing Guidelines representing the magni-
tude of the crime; 2) the per capita costs of drug trafficking as a mea-
sure of damages; and 3) the probability of conviction to consider
deterrence. Finally, Part V explains how a system such as the "exter-
nal cost index" could satisfy one possible excessiveness inquiry-the
three prong Solem proportionality test.34
30. Deterrence as a goal of punishment is a common theme of American law. For
example, the Notes by the House Committee reporting for the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act indicate the desire to deter drug trafficking through
penalty. The House Committee wrote: "This legislation is designed to deal in a compre-
hensive fashion with the growing menace of drug abuse in the United States ... (3) by
providing for an overall balanced scheme of criminal penalties for offenses involving
drugs." H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970).
31. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2801.
32. Id.
33. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
34. See infra note 101.
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I. The Austin Decision
A. Background of the Austin Decision
In Austin v. United States,35 the United States Supreme Court
critically examined the use of in rem forfeiture with some ground-
breaking results. The drug sale which triggered the Austin forfeiture
occurred on June 13, 1990. On this date, Richard Austin met with a
potential buyer at Austin's auto body shop, where Austin agreed to
sell the buyer cocaine.3 6 Austin then retrieved two grams of cocaine
from his mobile home and conducted the sale.3 7 The police acquired a
search warrant and recovered small amounts of drugs in both Austin's
shop and mobile home.38 Austin pleaded guilty in state court to one
count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
39
Shortly thereafter, the federal government brought a civil forfei-
ture action under 21 U.S.C. section 881(a)(4) and (7) against the body
shop and the mobile home.40 In defense against the seizure, Austin
argued that forfeiture of his home and business for conducting a
small-scale drug operation violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against excessive fines.4 The trial court rejected this argument
and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.42
The Eighth Circuit felt "constrained"43 to agree with the Ninth
Circuit's response to a request for an Eighth Amendment inquiry, in
which that court reasoned that "[i]f the constitution allows in rem for-
35. 113 S. Ct. at 2801.
36. United States v. 508'Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814, 815 (8th Cir. 1992).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 815-16. The search of the body shop uncovered a twenty-two caliber re-
volver, some marijuana, and $3,300 in cash, as well as a piece of mirror, a small white tube,
and a razor blade. The search of the mobile home yielded an electronic scale, a small bag
of cocaine, $660 in twenty dollar bills, a bundle of cocaine marked "1/2" and a bag of
marijuana. Id
39. Id. at 816.
40. Id
21 U.S.C. §881(a)(4) permits the government to seize '[a]ll conveyances.., which
are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the
transportation, sale, receipt, possession or concealment of illegal drugs or drug
paraphernalia. Section 881 (a)(7) authorizes forfeiture of '[a]ll real property...
in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements,
which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to
facilitate the commission of certain drug related crimes.
IaL at 816 n.2.
41. Id. at 817.
42. Id at 815.
43. Id. at 817.
feiture to be visited upon innocent owners.., the constitution hardly
requires proportionality review of forfeitures . . .44
The Eighth Circuit also looked briefly at history, concluding that
"the primary focus of the Eighth Amendment was the potential for
governmental abuse of its 'prosecutorial' power, not concern with the
extent or purposes of civil damages. '45 The court thought that "the
government ... [was] exacting too high a penalty in relation to the
offense committed," 46 and "sincerely hope[d] Congress ... re-exam-
ines § 881 and considers injecting some sort of proportionality re-
quirement into the statute. ..."47
B. Austin's Prescription: The Excessive Fines Clause Inquiry
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Austin's argu-
ment that forfeiture was unconstitutionally excessive. 48 The govern-
ment argued that its forfeiture action was not subject to the Excessive
Fines Clause because it was not criminal punishment.49 The Court re-
jected the government's argument and reversed the Eighth Circuit's
decision, holding that forfeiture under section 881 requires an Eighth
Amendment excessiveness inquiry.5
0
Justice Blackmun wrote for the five-four majority, consisting of
himself, Justices O'Connor, Souter, Stevens, and White.51 The Court
concluded that the appropriate question is not whether forfeiture
under section 881(a)(4) and (7) is civil or criminal, but rather whether
it is punishment.5 2 All members of the Court agreed that civil forfei-
ture can be punishment.5
3
The Court split, however, on the question of whether in rem for-
feiture requires personal culpability. 54 This division is crucial because
the test employed to evaluate excessiveness turns on this distinction.55
44. Id. (quoting United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232, 234 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 954 (1989)).




48. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2801.
49. Brief for Respondent at 12-13, Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (No.
92-6073).
50. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812. The Court did not fashion a test for its mandate.
Rather, it left this task to lower courts. Id.
51. Id. at 2802.
52. Id. at 2806.
53. Id. at 2805-2806, 2813, 2815.
54. Id. at 2814 (Scalia, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 2812. Contrary to the majority, Justice Scalia points out that the excessive-
ness analysis "must be different from that applicable to monetary fines ..... Id. at 2814
(Scalia, J., concurring). For a discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 78-87.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
August 1995] ECONOMIC THEORY APPLIED TO CIVIL FORFEITURE 1945
Regardless of the test employed, the Austin decision, requires lower
courts to engage in an Eighth Amendment excessiveness inquiry
before granting forfeiture under section 881.56
C. The Supreme Court's Basis for the Austin Decision
The Supreme Court has said that application of the Eighth
Amendment turns on its original meaning, "demonstrated by its his-
torical derivation. '57 Thus, the historical roots of the Excessive Fines
Clause are highly relevant to the question of whether it applies to
forfeiture.
(1) History of the Excessive Fines Clause
In England, before the Norman conquest, the Saxon legal system
provided that victims of wrongs would accept financial compensation
for their injury rather than seek retaliation or engage in "blood feuds"
with the wrongdoer's family.5 8 After 1066, this form of dispute resolu-
tion gave rise to a system in which wrongdoers placed themselves "in
the King's mercy" and, in order to gain clemency, were required to
pay an "amercement" to the Crown, its representative, or a feudal
lord.59 The Supreme Court has acknowledged the amercement's simi-
larity to a modern-day fine.60 Moreover, the Court has generally re-
ferred to the Magna Carta's limits on the amercement as the origin of
the Eighth Amendment.61
In response to periodic abuse of amercements, the Magna Carta
sought to make amercements proportional to wrongdoings by provid-
ing in part: "A Free man shall not be amerced for a small fault, but
after the manner of the fault; and for a great fault after the greatness
thereof, saving to him his contenement." 62 This part of the Magna
Carta was revitalized in the English Bill of Rights, adopted by the
Virginia Declaration of Rights, and implemented in the United States
Constitution as part of the Eighth Amendment.63
The fact that amercements served as sanctions for civil as well as
criminal wrongs64 weakens the government's argument that the
56. Id. at 2812.
57. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1977).
58. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 287 (1988) (cit-
ing WiLLAM SHARP McKEcHImE, MAGNA CARTA 284-285 (1958)).
59. Id. at 287-288 (quoting McKEcHNnE, supra at note 58, 285).
60. IkL at 289-90.
61. See id, at 290-291.
62. Id. at 270 n.14 (quoting MAGNA CARTA, 9 Hen. III, ch. 14 (1225)).
63. Gerald W. Boston, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment Application of
the Excessive Fines Clause, 5 COOLEY L. REv. 667, 708 (1988).
64. The majority opinion in Browning-Ferris, called amercements an "'all-purpose'
royal penalty," used for what today we would consider minor criminal offenses as well as
Eighth Amendment does not apply because section 881 forfeiture is a
civil action.65 The Austin Court dispensed with the government's ar-
gument by noting that "the history of the Eighth Amendment requires
no such limitation." 66
The Court concluded that the purpose of the Excessive Fines
Clause is to limit the government's power to take payments, "in cash
or in kind, as 'punishment for some offense."' 67 The majority held
that application of the Eighth Amendment depends on whether forfei-
ture is punishment. 68 Thus, the only remaining question was whether
forfeiture under sections 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) is properly considered
punishment in light of forfeiture's historical roots.69
(2) The History of Forfeiture
Statutory forfeitures were "likely a product of the confluence and
merger of the deodand tradition and the belief that the right to own
property could be denied the wrongdoer. ' 70 The deodand was an
English law providing that any property found to be instrumental in a
person's death would be forfeited to the Crown and used for some
pious purpose.71 It began as a penance of sorts, dating back to Bibli-
cal and pre-Judeo-Christian practices which believed that the instru-
ment was guilty, hence, religious expiation was required.72 When this
early application ceased "the deodand became a source of Crown rev-
enue . . . justified as a penalty for carelessness.
'73
The common-law tradition of the United States did not adopt de-
odands.74 However, the First Congress passed statutory forfeiture
laws.75 The Austin Court concluded that the First Congress consid-
ered forfeiture to be punishment.76 The Court explained that the
"'civil' wrongs." Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 269. Another commentator has noted that
the amercement was a monetary penalty assessed for a variety of illegal conduct "both civil
and criminal." Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some
Lessons From History, 40 VAND. L. Rnv. 1233, 1251 (1987).
65. See Brief for Respondent at 9, Austin v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2801 (1993) (No.
92-6073).
66. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804-05.
67. Id. at 2805 (quoting Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 265).
68. Id. at 2806.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2807 (quoting Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
682 (1974)).
71. WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICrONARY (3d College ed. 1988).
72. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2807.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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word "forfeit" was used for fine,77 suggesting a general understanding
that forfeitures were punitive in nature.
The Court also examined a line of its own cases that rejected the
"innocence" of the owner as a defense.78 Justice Blackmun's majority
opinion interpreted these holdings as based on the theory that the
owner of property used for illegal purposes is negligent, and therefore
culpable.79 Because civil forfeitures were based on the owner's culpa-
bility, they were punishment.
Conversely, Justice Scalia saw the caselaw as "far more ambigu-
ous"80 and rejected the proposition that in rem forfeiture requires
"negligence or any other form of culpability."81 For historical sup-
port, Justice Scalia pointed out that with deodands, juries confiscated
the instrument of death and nothing more.8 2 Thus, the property was
taken for its own guilt.
Justice Kennedy (joined by Justices Rehnquist and Thomas) con-
curred with Justice Scalia and noted that in rem forfeiture may be
imposed for reasons other than punishment, such as to remove prop-
erty that causes injury, to gain jurisdiction, or to serve remedial pur-
poses.8 3  The majority anticipated this argument, noting that"sanctions frequently serve more than one purpose." Moreover, "a
civil sanction that.., can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment."85
Even though Justice Scalia agreed that the Eighth Amendment
can cover civil forfeiture, 6 his concurring opinion ultimately disagrees
with the majority on the crucial question: is the punishment imposed
upon the property for its participation in the wrong or upon the owner
for his culpability?8 7 The nature of the punishment is directly related
to the majority's decision to require lower courts to perform an Eighth
Amendment excessiveness inquiry before granting forfeiture to the
77. ALa at 2808. The Court also looks to dictionaries of the time which confirm that
"fine" was thought to include "forfeit" and vice versa. Id. at 2808 n.7.
78. Id at 2808.
79. ItL
80. Id. at 2814 (Scalia, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 2814.
82. Id. at 2815. Justice Scalia gives an example where a man who is killed by a moving
cart would be avenged with the forfeiture of the cart and horses but if he died in a fall from
atop a wheel of a cart, only the wheel would be forfeited. Id
83. Id. at 2815-16.
84. Id. at 2806.
85. Id. at 2812 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)).
86. Id. at 2813. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion states that forfeiture of property
may be covered by the Eighth Amendment, noting that definitions of "forfeiture" and
"fine" reference each other in various 18th Century dictionaries.
87. Id. at 2814 (Scalia, J., concurring). See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
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government. The next section explores the possible criteria to apply
in the excessiveness inquiry.
II. Eighth Amendment Excessiveness Analysis-The Test
A. Naughty Owner or Naughty Property-Whose Culpability Should Be
Tested?
The proper test under the Supreme Court's mandate turns on
whether forfeiture serves as punishment for the owner's culpability or
for the guilt of the property.88 As noted above, the Austin majority
attributes forfeiture to the owner's culpability. 89 Under this view, an
appropriate test would be a proportionality analysis,90 which will be
outlined in Part II below.
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, believes only the property need
be guilty.91 In his view. the inquiry should involve the relationship
between the property and the offense: "Was [the wrong committed]
close enough to render the property. . . 'guilty' and hence forfeita-
ble?" 92 This position would uphold the fictional "guilty" property no-
tion that the majority has rejected. 93
B. The Proportionality Inquiry
Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist and Thomas voiced agreement with
Justice Scalia when he suggested that there have been reasons for for-
feiture other than culpability of the owner94. However, they also ad-
mit that the issue of whether forfeiture is permitted when the owner
has committed no wrong "would raise a serious question." 95 This is-
sue was not decided in Austin. Therefore, by concurring in the re-
sult-remand to the trial court for an excessiveness inquiry96-three
of the four justices in the minority concede that where the owner is
culpable an excessiveness inquiry should ensue. This implies that the
proper inquiry compares the owner's culpability to the forfeiture.
Hence, this Note approaches the mandated excessiveness inquiry with
88. See id 2814-2815.
89. Id. at 2812.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 97-101.
91. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2808-2809. The Austin majority does not rule out the potential use of the
connection between the property and the offense for the inquiry, but the decision in no
way limits use of other factors in making an excessiveness evaluation. Id at 2812 n.15. The
shared characteristics are recognized in the statute's requirement that the property facili-
tates the offense. See infra note 110.
94. Id. at 2815-16 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 2816.
96. Id. at 2812.
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a proportionality analysis which considers the property owner's
culpability.
C. The Proportionality Analysis
In Solem v. Helm 97 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment prohibits
not only barbaric punishment but sentences that are disproportionate
to the crime committed.98 Based on a recidivist statute, Helm had
been sentenced to life in prison for writing a bad check for $100.99
Even though all of Helm's prior crimes were nonviolent, none were
committed against a person, and alcohol was a contributing factor in
each, the recidivist statute applied.100 In ordering a constitutional as-
sessment of criminal sentences, the Supreme Court set forth an objec-
tive test for use by lower courts in evaluating sentences.101
In Browning-Ferris Industries Inc. v. Kelco Disposal Inc.,1°2 Jus-
tice O'Connor proposed that the formula advanced in Solem be used
to test the excessiveness of punitive damage awards. 0 3 Because Jus-
tice O'Connor's analysis involves the application of the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause to a penalty her test would also
be appropriate for the excessiveness inquiry.
O'Connor's formula parallels the Solem test. The formula in-
cludes three parts which provide that: (1) the reviewing court must
accord "substantial deference" to legislative standards mandating ap-
propriate sanctions for the conduct involved; (2) the court should
evaluate the gravity of the defendant's conduct and the harshness of
the penalty; and (3) the court should compare the penalty to the civil
and criminal penalties imposed for the same or similar conduct in dif-
97. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). In a 1991 case, Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991),
Justice Scalia questioned the viability of the Solem test. IcL at 2686. This view was joined
only by Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 2684. However, Kennedy's concurrence, in which Justices
O'Connor and Souter joined, concludes that Solem is still good law. Id. at 2707. More-
over, Justice White's dissent, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, concludes that the
Solem approach has "worked well in practice," Ild. at 2712, and that "there is no justifica-
tion for overruling or limiting Solen." Id at 2716.
98. Solem, 463 U.S. at 284.
99. Id at 281.
100. Id at 279-80. Helm's prior convictions included three third degree burglaries-
obtaining money under false pretenses, grand larceny, and driving while intoxicated. Id
101. The Supreme Court provided that courts should give substantial deference to leg-
islatures and consider the following objective criteria: 1) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty; 2) sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction;
and 3) sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id at
290-92.
102. 492 U.S. 257 (1988).
103. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 300-301.
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ferent jurisdictions and civil and criminal penalties imposed in the
same jurisdiction for different conduct that is similarly grave. 1°4
The following three subsections apply Justice O'Connor's
formula, illustrating that the proportionality test provides an Eighth
Amendment excessiveness inquiry as mandated by the Austin court.
(1) Legislative Standards
A look at the legislative history of the forfeiture statutes provides
limited insight to congressional intent. In 1970, Congress, envisioning
a "comprehensive" drug abuse and enforcement statute, enacted the
predecessor to section 881.105 The Committee Reports associated
with section 881's predecessor do not reveal an intent to define the
scope of forfeiture. The House Report does no more than set forth a
brief summary of the statute. 10 6 The Committee does, however, ex-
press concern with the problem of organized drug trafficking. 0 7
Moreover, the rehabilitative tone of the Committee discussion implies
104. Id. at 301. The explanation of the different conduct that should be evaluated in
the same jurisdiction is based on the Second Circuit's analysis of the Solem criteria. United
States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 38 (2d Cir. 1992).
In Harmelin, the Supreme Court was unable to agree on how the Solem criteria should
be applied. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2707. The three-justice concurrence consisting of Jus-
tices Kennedy, Souter and, notably, O'Connor, felt that only where a threshold showing of
gross disproportionality between the offense and the sentence exists should the following
factors be evaluated. Id. However, Justice O'Connor's recitation of all of the Solem fac-
tors in her Browning-Ferris opinion, with no threshold limitation, implies that the inquiry is
different when applied to forfeiture. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 301. This distinction
makes sense in light of the fact that forfeiture is an additional punishment, thus, the de-
fendant has already been criminally sanctioned for the underlying offense.
105. Consideration of the original conveyance forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C.S. § 511(a)
P.L. 91-513 (1970), is appropriate since its wording is nearly mirrored in the forfeiture
statute at issue-21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), which states in relevant part: "All conveyances,
including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or intended for use, to transport, or
in any way facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of prop-
erty... " 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(4) (1988).
In passing section 881's predecessor, the House Committee wrote:
This legislation is designed to deal in a comprehensive fashion with the growing
menace of drug abuse in the United States (1) through providing authority for
increased efforts in drug abuse prevention and rehabilitation of users, (2) through
providing more effective means for law enforcement aspects of drug abuse pre-
vention and control, and (3) by providing for an overall balanced scheme of crimi-
nal penalties for offenses involving drugs.
H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970).
See also id. at 6 (explaining that many pieces of legislation enacted at various times have
"necessarily given rise to a confusing and often duplicative approach .... This bill collects
and conforms these diverse laws in one piece of legislation .....
106. Id. at 55-56.
107. The findings and declarations of the bill focus on the trafficking in illegal drugs.
Id at 29.
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clemency towards simple users. 108 With this limited information, how-
ever, we cannot deduce an intent to favor forfeiture against drug traf-
fickers over those who only possess drugs. The next consideration is
the language of the statute.
The text of section 881 prescribes the broadest possible reach of
forfeiture.10 9 The language explains that use of or intent to use any
property or conveyance in any manner or part to facilitate the trans-
portation, sale, receipt, possession or concealment of illegal drugs or
drug paraphernalia may result in forfeiture." 0 However, by requiring
an Eighth Amendment inquiry, the Austin Court recognized that this
reach requires judicial scrutiny to pass constitutional muster."' Ac-
cordingly, Justice Thomas recently explained that under section
881(a)(7) "it may be necessary-in an appropriate case-to reevalu-
ate our generally deferential approach to legislative judge-
ments .... 1112 Hence, the substantial legislative deference prong of
Justice O'Connor's test must balance Congress' desire to provide for
comprehensive enforcement of drug abuse laws against the constitu-
tional rights of property owners."1
3
(2) Gravity of Conduct Verses Harshness of Penalty
The circuit court decisions involving forfeiture and the Eighth
Amendment illustrate how courts may compare gravity of conduct to
the harshness of an imposed penalty. For example, in United States v.
38 Whalers Cove Drive,"4 the Second Circuit used two of the Solem
criteria for its analysis. 15 This case involved forfeiture of a $68,000
interest in a condominium which was the site of two sales of cocaine
valued at $250.116 Though this case was decided before the Austin
holding, because the forfeiture was punitive in nature, the Second Cir-
108. The committee's goal was to reduce the use of drugs by reducing the availability,
indicating protective attitude towards users. Id. at 8. More specifically stated, if the abuser
was to be penalized, "he should not be penalized in the spirit of retribution," rather,
"[p]enalties should be designed to permit the offender's rehabilitation wherever possible."
Id at 9.
109. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
110. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(4)-(7) (1988).
111. The illustrious Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), instructs that the Constitu-
tion properly controls exercise of all government power including Congress. Id. at 137-38.
112. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 515 (1993)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113. The remaining parts of O'Connor's test provide for such a balancing.
114. 954 F.2d. at 29.
115. Id. at 38. These are the same criteria applied by Justice O'Connor and suggested
to be used in analyzing constitutionality of forfeiture by this Note. See supra text accompa-
nying note 104.
116. Id. at 32.
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cuit performed an Eighth Amendment analysis. The court decided
the forfeiture was constitutional. 117
The 38 Whalers Cove Drive court first examined the "inherent
gravity of the offense." 1 8 It cited the Supreme Court's language in
Harmelin v. Michigan,119 which characterized drug offenses as "a seri-
ous threat to individuals and society.' 20 The court also noted Justice
Scalia's auspicious grant to the Michigan legislature to "take appropri-
ate measures to address 'the situation on the streets of Detroit,"'
while approving a life sentence imposed for possession of 672 grams of
cocaine.' 2' The 38 Whalers Cove Drive court relied on Harmelin to
conclude that the serious nature of drug trafficking alone was disposi-
tive of the inherent gravity of conduct inquiry.' 22
By contrast, in United States v. Sarbello,123 the Third Circuit ap-
plied a more in-depth analysis to a RICO forfeiture, looking not only
at the "seriousness" of the offense, but also at the moral gravity and
nature of its harmful reach.124 In its decision, which preceded Austin,
the Sarbello court remanded the case for an Eighth Amendment in-
quiry.125 Since Austin, in United States v. R.R. #1126 the Third Circuit
reiterated the analysis it set forth in Sarbello,127 remanding the case to
the district court with an order to consider "all the circumstances" in
the case for an excessiveness inquiry.128
In United States v. Busher,129 the Ninth Circuit remanded a
RICO conviction to the district court for an excessiveness inquiry.
117. Id. at 39.
118. Id. at 38-39.
119. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (upholding mandatory life sentence for possession of 672
grams of cocaine).
120. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d at 38-39 (citing Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2680).
121. Id. at 39 (quoting Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2706).
122. Id. at 38-39; see also National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 668 (1989) (stating that drug use and distribution is one of the "greatest problems
affecting the health and welfare of our population."). The context of National Treasury
Employees Union was the Supreme Court's review of the constitutionality of mandatory
drug testing for certain customs service agents. Id. at 656.
123. 985 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1993) (analyzing RICO forfeiture under Eighth Amendment
Excessive Fines Clause).
124. Id. at 724.
125. In Sarbello, the defendant's entire business was forfeited under RICO when only
10% of the asset facilitated wrongdoing. Id. at 719.
126. 14 F.3d 864 (3d Cir. 1994) (reviewing a forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)
(1988).
127. Id. at 875.
128. Id. at 876.
129. 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987). In this case, Judge Kozinski, of the Ninth Circuit,
was the first to hold that forfeiture under § 1963(a) of RICO required a proportionality
determination under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1415. Despite the criminal nature of
RICO forfeitures, many of the factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit may be applied to a
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The court suggested consideration of the Solem criteria with the fol-
lowing expansion:
In comparing the penalty imposed to the gravity of the offense,
the district court may consider the circumstances surrounding the
defendant's criminal conduct. 130 More particularly, Solem noted
that, in considering the gravity of the offense, a court should look
both at the harm suffered by the victim and the defendant's
culpability.1
31
The Ninth Circuit also found it appropriate to consider the sever-
ity of the penalty in relation to the magnitude of the harm caused by
the defendant's conduct, including "the dollar volume of the loss
caused, whether physical harm to persons was inflicted, threatened or
risked, and whether the crime had severe collateral consequences, e.g.,
drug addiction."'132 The court also pointed out that the benefit reaped
by the convicted defendant was a relevant consideration. However,
the court noted that a "forfeiture is not rendered unconstitutional be-
cause it exceeds the harm to the victims or the benefit to the defend-
ant.' 33 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the use of RICO to exact
costs beyond those directly and collaterally caused by the crime,
through forfeiture of assets exceeding the harm caused or benefit
reaped by a defendant, was justified by the fact that forfeiture is
"[a]fter all... intended to be punitive.'
34
In summation, this collection of circuit court opinions illustrates
that courts weigh the severity of the offense with inquiries varying in
depth, ranging from: a) disposing of the inquiry due to the inherent
graveness of drug offenses in 38 Whalers Cove Drive, to b) considering
the "harmful reach" of the crime in Sarbello, and finally, c) a quite
specific inquiry into the actual harm caused in Busher.
(3) Civil and Criminal Penalties in the Same and Other Jurisdictions
The most appropriate measure of penalty will be the sanction for
the underlying offense. For example, where the owner faces forfeiture
because of "willful blindness,"' 35 courts should compare damage
awards for similar negligence in tort actions to the value of the forfei-
proportionality analysis of civil forfeiture. Brief for Petitioner at 38, Austin v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (No. 92-6073).
130. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797-801 (1982) (examining the circum-
stances of defendant's crime in great detail).




135. The innocent owner defense does not protect against willful blindness. 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(4)(C) (1988).
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ture.136 On the other hand, where an underlying criminal offense is
involved, the logical place to start is with the sentence imposed in the
criminal proceeding.
1111. Econonic Theory Applied to Forfeiture-Efficiency and
Deterrence Through Reallocation of External Costs
A. External Costs
Economic theory shows that the reallocation of external costs of
drug offenses, as suggested by the Ninth Circuit in Busher,137 is effi-
cient and will deter the behavior. External costs138 are those pro-
duced by an actor's conduct aside from those for which he or she must
pay directly. 39 For example, pollution resulting from manufacturing
is a cost imposed upon individuals external to the actor, the
manufacturer.
Economic theory says that failure to internalize external costs
results in allocative inefficiency. 140 This result is due to the actor's
failure to consider external costs in his or her production choices.
Hence, the best use of resources may not be achieved. For example,
because price reflects manufacturing costs, the price of goods will be
lower when the manufacturer is not required to pay for anti-pollution
costs. Yet failure to invest in anti-pollution equipment results in the
external cost to society of pollution.141 Meanwhile, consumers may
prefer to pay a higher price for goods in exchange for the cleaner air
that would result from anti-pollution expenditures. This is a more ef-
ficient allocation of resources.
Similarly, the drug trafficker creates many social costs that do not
affect his profit.142 Because the drug dealer does not pay for external
costs in the areas of law enforcement, judicial and legal services, cor-
rections, care for related health problems, drug programs, drug educa-
tion, or for the non-monetary pain and anguish associated with drug
dependency, he realizes greater profits. Society currently pays for
these costs with taxes, the diminished productivity of addicts, and the
136. Perhaps damage awards in suits involving negligent landowners paying for their
tortious tenant's actions would be applicable.
137. 817 F.2d at 1415.
138. For a general discussion of external costs, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,




142. Of course it does not make sense to say that just because the public would prefer
fewer addicts instead of a greater supply of drugs the dealer will sell less. While manufac-
turers may voluntarily internalize their external costs by complying with antipollution reg-
ulations, a mechanism such as forfeiture will be necessary to force drug dealers to
internalize their external costs.
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lost resource of drug-free persons. If the monetary external costs
were levied upon drug traffickers by way of forfeiture, the risk of lost
profits would deter a number of traffickers from entering the busi-
ness. 143 While this decrease in supply' 44 will not likely diminish the
current demand for drugs, decreased availability of drugs may inhibit
the creation of new addicts. Accordingly, courts can use economic
theory to justify allocation of the external costs of the drug trade to
drug traffickers via forfeiture' 45 because this allocation will deter deal-
ers who are rational and risk averse,146 and deterrence is a primary
goal of the forfeiture statute.147
B. Allocation of External Costs is Efficient and Deters Drug Trafficking
In the interest of 1) efficiency and 2) deterrence, some portion of
these costs should be allocated through civil forfeiture to drug dealers
who are successfully convicted.
(1) Imposing Systematic Costs on Convicted Drug Traffickers is Efficient
Efficient allocation places costs on the least cost avoider.'4a In
other words, the most effective imposition of costs is upon the entity
which can bear such costs most easily. For instance, in the manufac-
turing example given above, the polluting manufacturer may curb pol-
luting activity, perhaps by installing screening devices on his smoke
stacks. Alternately, the public, through taxes, may resort to some sort
of vacuum system to suck pollution from the sky. The manufacturer
can clearly solve the pollution problem by prevention, which carries a
lower cost. Thus, the manufacturer is the least cost avoider because
he can solve the pollution problem (avoid the cost) at the smallest
expense.
143. A class of drug traffickers exists which can be attributed with such profit maximiz-
ing goals. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
144. Because convicted traffickers are incarcerated and their property forfeited, unlike
the manufacturer example infra; the costs will not be passed to drug buying customers.
Instead, the profitability of the industry will be diminished, and, in turn, supply will
decrease.
145. See infra text accompanying notes 149-51.
146. See infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
147. Notes by the House Committee indicate the desire to deter drug trafficking
through penalty. The House Committee wrote:
Ibis legislation is designed to deal in a comprehensive fashion with the growing
menace of drug abuse in the United States... (3) by providing for an overall
balanced scheme of criminal penalties for offenses involving drugs.
H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970).
148. See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 569 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing Gumo
CALABP.FsE, THm Cost OF AccrEmrs 69-73 (1970); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 1 (1960).
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Decreasing the number of drug traffickers by imposing upon
them a portion of the societal costs of drug use and trafficking
149
through civil forfeitures may curb trafficking by removing profits.
While extraction of property has social and individual costs-compro-
mised freedom and equality 5 -these costs will almost certainly be
lower than the costs imposed on society from subsequent traffickers
who are not deterred. 151 Hence, convicted drug traffickers are the
least cost avoiders and imposition of a reasonable portion of costs
upon them is efficient.
(2) Calculated and Directed Civil Forfeiture Will Deter Drug Trafficking
Economic analysis is also useful in terms of reaching the goal of
deterrence. Economists note that an offender is deterred by expected
punishment. 52 They also recognize that criminals are risk avoiders. 53
Moreover, some criminals make fairly rational decisions about their
career choice, indicating that raising the price of crime would reduce
the frequency of the its commission.' 54 Predicting rational behavior
makes particularly good sense with drug trafficking where profit often
motivates the activity.155 There appears to be a category of drug traf-
fickers who display risk averse behavior, and considering the substan-
tial profits involved, can be treated as investors in the distribution
business.' 56 These investors put time and money into distributing
drugs and are averse to the risk of penalty. 57
149. Societal costs of drug trafficking include law enforcement, judicial and legal serv-
ices, corrections, related health problems, drug programs, and education.
150. Forfeiting property from individuals to pay some portion of societal costs in the
areas of the justice system, drug related health care, education, and corrections exacts costs
on society in the intangible areas of both equality and freedom. Specifically, highly valued
freedom is implicated because property is taken against rightful owners' free will. Equality
is also compromised since asset owners will pay more for their crimes than traffickers who
own nothing.
151. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
152. George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, in ESSAYS IN THE Eco-
NOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 56 (1974).
153. GARY S. BECKER, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN
THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 11 (1974).
154. Gordon TUllock, Does Punishment Deter Crime, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Summer
1974, at 106.
155. See infra note 156.
156. This analogy can be shown in two ways. First, the enormous profit they reap. See
Anderson, Justice Department Leaves Mob Assets Intact, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1981, at
B16 (through heroin operations, one organization acquired $10 to $16 million a year). Sec-
ond, by their risk adverse behavior. See Belkin, The Booty of Drugs Enriches Agencies,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1990 (Lisa Graffis, who manages seized and forfeited property for the
U.S. Marshal in Texas, commented that drug dealers are leasing vehicles and renting
homes so that they cannot be seized). See also infra text accompanying note 159.
157. This dealer can be identified through the procedure discussed in note 186 and
accompanying text.
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Basic risk analysis says that a risk averse and profit-maximizing
individual will invest up to a point where the risk approaches the
profit.158 Imagine, for example, a student who can purchase a parking
pass for $100 per a 10 week quarter. Assume that without the pass the
student risks one ticket per week. If a parking ticket fine is $8, the
student may rationally choose to sneak into the lot and pay up to $80
in fines, still coming out $20 ahead. If, on the other hand, the fine is
$12, the student stands to lose $20 by gambling on sneaking into the
lot. Hence, with a $12 fine, the risk averse student would opt to buy
the pass.
Indeed, the risk-balancing behavior described above has been at-
tributed to criminals. Economist George Stigler asserts that offenders
are deterred by expected punishment, which equals the probability of
punishment multiplied by the punishment.159 Under this logic, the
drug trafficker will be deterred if the probability of conviction multi-
plied by the predictable punishment outweighs the benefit he can rea-
sonably expect.
The forfeiture statute as applied prior to Austin rolled out the
cannon in an effort to deter drug trafficking. 160 Austin's mandate
forces courts to rethink Congress' "take it all" tack. However, in order
to achieve deterrence through forfeiture that is proportionate to the
crime, Part IV of this Note sets forth a method by which to calculate
an amount attributable to the drug trafficker that will efficiently deter
future drug trafficking activity. Thus, under the theory of external
cost allocation, we can direct systematic costs through civil forfeiture
to achieve efficiency and deterrence.
C. Legal Support for Imposing External Costs on Convicted Drug
Traffickers
Courts currently allocate external costs. For example, the
Supreme Court allows compensation for government's direct costs re-
sulting from criminal acts, calling them a form of "liquidated dam-
ages" for harm caused by the individual wrongdoer.16' Furthermore,
the Ninth Circuit recognizes "collateral" costs as an appropriate con-
158. This point is calculated using the investor's utility function. For this basic discus-
sion we will omit mathematical calculations.
159. STIGLER, supra note 152, at 56. For this analysis, I will ignore the possibility that
other punishment was imposed at the criminal phase of the case. Indeed, civil forfeiture
does not require a criminal conviction.
160. The broad and indiscriminate coverage of the forfeiture statute is described at
notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
161. See United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 36 (1992) (citing 21
U.S.C. § 881(e) (1988); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237
(1972) (per curiam)); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687 &
n.26 (1974)).
sideration for quantifying the harm caused by the defendant's con-
duct.162 Additionally, the Second Circuit considers it perfectly
acceptable to allocate "reasonable . . . generalized enforcement
costs-in the nature of overhead"-to the defendant.163 Thus, the
government may use forfeiture to compensate itself for investigation
and enforcement costs.164 Therefore, it is plausible to allocate exter-
nal costs to defendants in determining proportionate forfeitures.
IV. The External Cost Index
The external cost index developed in this section provides a
model intended to guide legislatures in giving courts a mechanism
with which to calculate a forfeiture amount based on the specific facts
of each case which is efficient, proportionate to the crime, and geared
toward deterrence.
A. Factors Adopted in the External Cost Index
(1) Sentencing Guidelines-the "Severity Factor" Used to Achieve
Proportionality
Because the Federal Sentencing Guidelines reflect Congress's
opinion of the varying culpability associated with different types and
amounts of drugs, they can be used to measure the severity of a partic-
ular crime.165 This factor distinguishing severity is essential because
the crimes covered by the forfeiture statute create different external
162. See supra text accompanying note 132.
163. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d at 37. However, in United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435, 449-450 (1989), the defendant was convicted of 65 counts of medicare fraud, for a
total cost to the government of $585 and was fined for each violation, resulting in a
$130,000 fine. Since the sanction was presumed to be punitive, the Supreme Court shifted
the burden to the government to prove its costs through an accounting, noting, however,
that leeway was to be given, particularly in view of quantifying the exact amount of costs.
Thus, the government will likely be called upon to justify costs attributed to defendants.
164. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d at 36. The allocation, however, must not be
incommensurate with the portion of costs represented by the particular offense. Id at 37.
165. The Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual documents the goals Congress
imparted upon the Commission. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES
MANUAL, ch.1, pt.A, intro. cmt. (Nov. 1994) [hereinafter, U.S.S.G.]. Specifically, Congress
sought proportionality in sentencing through a system that would impose appropriately
different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity. Id. Congress set forth spe-
cific directives for the Commission to consider, such as the nature and degree of harm
caused by the offense, and community views and concerns about the gravity of the offense.
28 U.S.C. § 994 (c) (1988).
Specific to drug control, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act was enacted in 1986 to alter federal
drug sentencing by expanding the practice of linking sentences to drug quantity. H.R. REP.
No. 845, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 11-12 (1986). The underlying rationale of the Act was to
punish drug traffickers based on the amount of the substance they were dealing in the
market sense. Id. at 17.
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costs. For example, section 881(a)(4) covers the sale, receipt, posses-
sion or concealment of illegal drugs or drug paraphernalia within a
range of types and amounts of drugs.166 Under this section, a person
cultivating marijuana not for distribution 67 and a person conducting a
large scale cocaine distribution conspiracy'68 are equally subject to
forfeiture. 169
The external costs generated by an individual growing marijuana
for personal use will be limited to the costs of law enforcement, drug
education, and potentially related health care.170 On the other hand,
the person involved in a large scale conspiracy to distribute addictive
drugs171 creates external costs in the nature of addicts who often turn
to crime to support their habit. 72 Thus, costs attributable to the drug
dealer are substantially greater than those attributable to the drug
possessor. A bigger slice of the government's liquidated or collateral
damages should be visited upon drug dealers than upon drug
possessors. 73
Similar to the procedure for sentencing, 74 courts evaluating for-
feitures should hold evidentiary hearings to determine how much of a
controlled substance is attributable to an owner.175 A base offense
166. Section 881(a)(4) provides for "all controlled substances which have been manu-
factured, distributed, dispensed or acquired" in violation of section 881. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)
(1988) (emphasis added). This includes harvesting of marijuana.
167. United States v. 566 Hendrickson Boulevard, 986 F.2d 990, 997 (6th Cir 1993)
(upholding forfeiture of a home worth $65,000 for possession of two marijuana plants and
an incomplete, non-operational cultivation system, with no accusation of distribution).
168. United States v. 3201 Caughey Road, 715 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (forfeiture
resulting from large scale conspiracy to distribute cocaine).
169. "[Tjhe transportation of any quantity of drugs however minute is admittedly suffi-
cient to merit the forfeiture of [a] vehicle." United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado
Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 425 (2d Cir. 1977).
170. For this analysis we will not consider the external costs imposed upon people close
to the defendant such as family mehibers and employer since these costs are more person-
alized and, thus, less in the nature of true external social costs.
171. Expert testimony given before Congress reported that marijuana is not addictive.
H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970).
172. Indirect costs of drug trafficking are substantial. They include added financial
burdens on taxpayers to support narcotics law enforcement, drug clinics and entitlement
programs that multiply partly because of the thousands of incapacitated addicts incapable
of providing for themselves. The more direct costs, the criminal fall-out, however, is even
more serious. Theft is a common method of maintaining a costly drug addiction. See For-
feiture of Narcotics Proceeds: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980) (statement of Sen. Biden).
173. See infra text accompanying notes 187-92.
174. For example, under unlawful trafficking or possession, the guidelines provide
starting base offense levels of the following: level 38 for 150 kilograms or more of cocaine;
34 for between 15 and 50 kilograms of cocaine; 10 for between 1 and 2.5 kilograms of
marijuana; and 6 for less than 250 grams of marijuana. U.S.S.G., supra note 165, at
§ 2D1.1.
175. United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 489 (1st Cir. 1993).
level will be determined by the amount of drugs involved. For exam-
ple, the Sentencing Guidelines provide the noted base offense levels
for:
17 6
Level 6: Less than 250 grams of Marijuana;
Less than 50 grams of Hashish;
Less than 5 grams of Hashish Oil ....
Level 44: At least 5 grams but less than 10 grams of Heroin;
At least 25 grams but less than 50 grams of Cocaine;
At least 5 kilograms but less than 10 kilograms of
Marijuana ....
Level 28: At least 2 kilogram but less than 3.5 kilograms of
Cocaine;
At least 400 grams but less than 700 grams of
Heroin ....
Level 42: 30 kilograms or more of Heroin;
150 kilograms or more of Cocaine ....
Additionally, as with the current sentencing procedure, the court
should consider past relevant conduct (prior trafficking/possession
charges and convictions) to mitigate or enhance the base offense
level. 17
7
Once the offense level is determined, it should be divided by the
highest possible level (currently 38) to represent the severity of the
owner's crime compared to the most severe drug crime rated by the
guidelines. 178 For example, as noted above, nine kilograms of mari-
juana yields an offense level of 14. The severity factor will be found
by dividing 14 by the maximum offense level: 38. Hence, for nine
kilograms of marijuana the severity factor will be 14/42, or .34, yield-
ing a severity factor of 34 when multiplied by 100 (in order to produce
a whole number to facilitate later application). This process will result
in a number for use in allocating systematic external costs.
176. U.S.S.G., supra note 165, at § 2D1.1(a). These levels translate into sentences va-
rying from 15 to 21 months for level 14 to 360 months to life for level 42. Id. at ch.5, pt.
1.A.
177. For example, if the defendant was a "minimal participant" in the criminal activity
there will be a four level decrease. U.S.S.G., supra note 165, at § 3B1.2(a). On the other
hand, the guidelines provide some harsh levels for past crimes where the defendant has
been characterized as a career criminal. Id § 4B1.1(3) (providing high offense levels re-
gardless of initial base level). For our purposes, if this section is to apply, it must first be
determined that the crime is related to the underlying reason for the forfeiture. The Ninth
Circuit has noted that the sentencing court shall consider all relevant conduct, not just that
which is cited in the count of the conviction. United States v. Hatley, 15 F.3d 856, 859 (9th
Cir. 1994). Thus, all conduct related to the drug distribution or possession should apply,
including any past similar offenses.
178. The current guideline range should be adjusted, and perhaps broadened, for this
purpose.
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(2) Probability of Conviction-the "Deterrence Multiple"-
As discussed earlier, a primary goal of punishment is deterrence,
and the Supreme Court considers forfeiture to be punishment.
179
Thus, the goal of forfeiture is deterrence. 180 Accordingly, this propo-
sal must include deterrence among its goals. As discussed earlier,
economists note that criminals are deterred by expected punishment
in the amount of the probability of punishment times the expected
punishment. The probability of conviction parallels the probability of
punishment. Accordingly, the probability of conviction should be
used as the deterrence multiple.181
According to the Drugs and Crime Data Center and Clearing-
house, in 1990, 30% of drug arrests resulted in conviction.'82 Thus,
70% of arrests for which states expended resources failed to yield con-
victions. Viewing the costs of all arrests as the price for successful
convictions and allocating an equal cost to each arrest, the conviction
of one drug offender costs the government 2.3 times as much as the
cost directly imputable to that person's arrest. Thus, only 50% of ar-
rests for which the government pays result in conviction.
Accordingly, the model uses a multiple of two composed of one
for the external costs directly attributable to the convicted drug of-
fender,183 plus one for the external cost of "unsuccessful arrests" asso-
ciated with the conviction.184 Thus, the external cost amount, which
will be developed in the next section, will be multiplied by the severity
factor,1 85 then multiplied by the deterrence factor: 2.186
179. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2813-14. See infra Part I(C)(iii) for discussion.
180. See supra note 147.
181. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
182. This percentage was calculated by dividing the following two statistics: In 1990
there were 1,089,500 drug offense arrests in state courts. DRUGS AND CRimE DATA
CENTER & CLEARINGHOUSE, FACT SHEET. DRUG DATA SUMMARY 2 1994. Of those
1,089,500 drug offense arrests, 328,000 convictions were noted. Id. at 4.
183. Imposing these costs has been commended by the Court. See supra note 161 and
accompanying text.
184. See, eg., infra text accompanying note 189.
185. See infra Part IV(A)(i).
186. The deterrence multiple of 2 serves two purposes: 1) deterrence-because
probability of conviction (.49) multiplied by an appropriate fine (the external costs mea-
sure to be developed in the next section) should deter trafficking; and 2) using the multiple
of two incorporates the proportion of external costs allocable to each convicted trafficker,
namely 51% over costs directly imputable to the convicted trafficker.
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(3) Per Capita Cost of Drug Trafficking to Society-A Measure of
External Costs
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, California's' 87 1990
per capita 188 cost of the justice system, including police protection,
courts, prosecution and legal services, as well as corrections, was
$376.06.189 Since drug offenses comprised only 28.3% 190 of the arrests
for 1990, this figure must be pared down to $106.42 ($376.06 x .283).191
The per capita cost of drug programs-$359.15192-should then be ad-
ded. Therefore, the 1990 total per capita annual cost of the justice
system and drug programs attributable to drug offenses in California
was $465.57. This amount can be used to represent the external cost
generated by the drug offender, and the number to which the model
applies the severity factor and the deterrence multiple outlined above.
(4) Application of the External Cost Index
The best way to illustrate how a system like the external cost in-
dex would work is to apply it to the two cases described in the intro-
duction of this note: 9 3
1) In the first case, the Chicago properties were seized for the sale
of three kilograms of cocaine. 194 The severity factor described above
would begin with a base offense level of 28.195 The severity factor will
be 67 (28/42 x 100). Applying the deterrence multiple of two yields
134 (67 x 2). Finally, 134 will be multiplied by the measure of external
costs-$465.57-to reach the amount forfeitable under the external
cost index: $62,386.38.
187. The use of California statistics is merely illustrative. An index developed by Con-
gress should allow for each state to use its own cost statistics.
188. The per capita amount is used to better represent the amount attributable to a
single individual. Because the drug trafficker is usually a resident of the state in which the
conviction/crime occurred, this amount will have been expended for his or her benefit.
189. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 5 (Kathleen Maguire et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
190. BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS AND SPECIAL SERVICES, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CRIME AND DELINOUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 145 (1990).
191. The resulting figure will be conservative since many drug offense arrests involve a
great deal of investigation and undercover and informant costs.
192. The combined federal and state expenditure on drug programs in 1989-90 was
$106,885,000. Governor's Budget Summary 1990-1991, Schedule 9, Appendix p. 34. Cali-
fornia's 1990 population was 29,760,021. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, SUMMARY SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND
HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS: CALIFORNIA 1 (1992).
193. This application is imprecise because the measure of external cost in the model is
based on California statistics and the cases took place in Chicago and Ohio. However, this
application serves as an example. Actual application of the model requires precise statis-
tics and overhaul of the sentencing guidelines.
194. See supra note 7.
195. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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2) On the other hand, in the second case the Sizemore's home
was forfeited for approximately 7.5 grams of marijuana. 196 Here the
base offense level would be six.'9 It seems that this offense level
should be mitigated,198 perhaps by four, because the Sizemore's were
given the lightest sentence possible' 99 and probably had no prior of-
fenses. Thus, the severity factor will be 4.8 ([6 - 4]/42 x 100). Apply-
ing the deterrence multiple yields 9.6 (4.8 x 2). Finally, 9.6 will be
applied to the measure of external costs, yielding a forfeitable amount
of $4,469.47 ($465.57 x 9.6).
V. Use of the External Cost Index as a Mechanism for
Executing Forfeiture Satisfies the Three Prong Solem
Test
Recall that the proportionality analysis outlined in Part II pro-
vides for the following considerations:200 (1) deference to legislative
standards; (2) balancing the gravity of the conduct against the harsh-
ness of the penalty; and (3) comparison to civil and criminal penalties
imposed in the same and other jurisdictions. Application of the exter-
nal cost index synthesizes all of the interests in this analysis.
A. Deference to Legislative Intent
Both the severity factor20 and the deterrence multiple2°2 serve
legislative intent. The severity factor incorporates the Sentencing
Guidelines, which were drafted by Congress to impose appropriate
sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity by linking
sentences to drug quantities.203 Because the external cost index
utilizes the severity factor to make forfeitures proportionate to the
amount of drugs seized,204 the legislative goal of proportionate pun-
ishment which is expressed in the guidelines is achieved.
The deterrence multiple uses the probability of conviction as a
gauge by which to determine a fine that will deter.205 Because deter-
rence is recognized by Congress as a primary aspiration of punish-
196. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. It seems the guidelines should be
broadened, at least at the bottom end. Since they begin at 250 grams of marijuana or less,
the small quantities are equated with 250 grams.
197. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
198. The Guidelines currently provide for enhancing and mitigating based on past con-
duct. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 174 through 178 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
ment,2 06 as well as an aim of the forfeiture statute,207 the external cost
index furthers another legislative goal. Thus, the external cost index
advances legislative intent and satisfies the first prong of the propor-
tionality test.
B. Balancing the Gravity of the Conduct Against the Harshness of the
Penalty
Balancing the gravity of the conduct versus the harshness of the
penalty is achieved through the use of both the severity factor20 8 and
the measure of external costs.2 09 Because it is derived from the Sen-
tencing Guidelines which base the offense level on the amount of
drugs seized,210 the severity factor has a built-in systematic balancing,
satisfying the second prong of the proportionality test.
In addition, the measure of external cost reflects the per-capita
cost of drug offenses. Use of this measure inherently correlates con-
duct with its cost to society. Moreover, because the external cost mea-
sure is ameliorated by the severity factor and the deterrence multiple,
it correlates costs imposed upon society to the specific drug offense.
The deterrence multiple, two, consists of one for costs directly
attributable to the offender and one for systematic costs. Thus, apply-
ing the deterrence multiple to the external cost measure approximates
the government's actual liquidated costs attributable to the offender
based on culpability as determined by both society and Congress.21'
Accordingly, the external cost index provides a model for a con-
sistent, systematic balancing of the gravity of the underlying drug of-
fense and the harshness of the forfeiture.
C. Comparison to Civil and Criminal Penalties Imposed in the Same and
Other Jurisdictions
Since this comparison against other penalties across jurisdictions
is a part of a proportionality test, one interpretation may be that the
test strives for similarity among jurisdictions. The external cost index
clearly achieves such similarity. By applying this index, forfeitures
will vary depending only on the facts of each case and the external
costs calculated for the state in which the case arises.212 Even if for-
206. For one example, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 provided for the develop-
ment of guidelines that would further the basic purposes of criminal punishment, including
among other things-deterrence. U.S.S.G., supra note 165, at ch.1, pt.A, intro. cmt.
207. See supra note 108.
208. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
209. See Part IV(A)(iii) infra.
210. See supra notes 176 through 178 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 165.
212. See infra Part IV for complete discussion.
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feitures are significantly different between states as a result of vari-
ance in state per-capita expenditures on drug offenses,213 the model
still metes out fines proportionate to the drug offense because the for-
feitures will still reflect the crime's relative cost to society. Hence, the
third and final prong of the Solem test is satisfied.
Conclusion
Because history indicates that civil forfeitures are punishment
and that the Eighth Amendment applies to civil as well as criminal
punishment,2 14 the Austin Court mandated an excessiveness inquiry in
all forfeiture cases.2 15 One appropriate test for this inquiry is a pro-
portionality analysis, as derived from Solem v. Helm216 and applied to
a penalty by Justice O'Connor in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco
Disposal217
To satisfy the proportionality test, this Note develops a model-
the external cost index-which dispenses forfeitures based on the
amount of drugs seized in a manner designed to deter. Thus, forfei-
ture allocates societal costs to the wrongdoer in a proportionate mea-
sure.218  Under a system such as the external cost index, the
Sizemores would likely still be homeowners, the Chicago property
owner would have received a stiff but fair fine, and both forfeitures
would have been proportionate to the harm imposed upon society and
economically efficient.
213. For example, West Virginia's total per-capita expenditures for the justice system
in 1990 were $97.30, compared to California's $376.06. SOURCBOOK, supra note 189, at 5.
214. See Part I infra.
215. See Part I infra.
216. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
217. 492 U.S. 257 (1989). See supra text accompanying notes 102-04 for discussion.
218. See Part IV which outlines the external cost index, and Part VI which illustrates its
application.

